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Libertarianism, Law and Economics, and 
the Common Law 
Todd J. Zywicki 
Libertarian legal theory has long had admiration for, but also distrust 
of, the common law and law and economics. This distrust is partly 
methodological. Libertarian legal theory has traditionally been 
deontological and normatively-oriented, typically grounded in natural 
rights theory and reasoning to normative statements about the content of 
the law. Law and economics, by contrast, purports to be a positive theory 
of the common law foremost, while providing a normative justification for 
the common law as well (namely, social wealth maximization as a 
normative value). Indeed, it is this primarily positive thrust of law and 
economics that accounts to a large extent for its influence on legal thinking, 
while its normative arguments have been much more heavily contested. 
To be sure, there is a long and deep affinity between libertarianism, 
law and economics, and the common law—libertarians clearly appreciate 
the pivotal historical importance of the English common law in the 
historical emergence of a free and commercial society. Moreover, in the 
vast run of cases—including issues such as the enforceability of contracts 
and the basic value of clear property rights—libertarian philosophy, law 
and economics, and the common law converge on similar results. Still, I 
submit that libertarians remain wary of the pragmatism and contextualism 
that historically has defined common law reasoning. Moreover, conflicts 
occasionally do arise between libertarianism on the one hand, and the 
common law and law and economics on the other. 
At the outset, I note that for purposes of this essay I will generally use 
the common law and law and economics interchangeably. This is not 
because I think that they are actually interchangeable—they are not. In this 
essay, however, I am going to focus on those issues where it seems to me 
that the common law deviates from libertarian theory (or where libertarian 
theory provides indeterminate answers) but the result can be explained as 
being consistent with law and economics principles, such as the doctrine of 
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necessity. This is not to say that there are other areas in which common law 
doctrine deviates from economic analysis but is consistent with libertarian 
theory (I am not aware of any), or where the common law deviates from 
both economics and libertarianism (such as perhaps modern liability law). 
It is just to focus on those areas of disagreement between two different 
approaches to law. 
To be sure, the generalized descriptions I attach to the competing 
approaches paint with a broad and crude brush—I hope that those who 
know me and my work will grant that I have deep sympathies for both 
approaches to the law, and I have no agenda or desire to misrepresent 
either. Indeed, to some extent this essay is autobiographical, charting the 
course of a libertarian who came to embrace the common law and law and 
economics. This essay describes the kind of questions that prompted my 
gradual conversion, and in those particular situations where they conflict, I 
place more faith in the common law and law and economics than 
philosophical libertarianism and its implications. So while one may in the 
end contest the frameworks that I have constructed around these two 
competing visions of law, be aware that these are my constructs in the sense 
that I am an advocate for neither but rather a somewhat disinterested 
answer-seeker about the world. I have no agenda, other than to come up 
with the system of law that I think is most conducive to coordination and 
human flourishing in society. 
I.  LAW AND ECONOMICS V. LIBERTARIANISM IN A WORLD WITHOUT 
TRANSACTION COSTS 
A. Law and Economics 
Consider a common hypothetical that illustrates differing approaches 
to legal questions. A factory operates upstream and is the world’s sole 
manufacturer of a children’s vaccine that saves, say, one million children 
worldwide every year. Assume we estimate that the value to “society” of 
this vaccine is $1 billion. Downstream lives an old man we will call Mr. 
Montgomery Burns. Assume that one day each year, the vaccine 
manufacturer releases a byproduct into the stream that causes a mild smell 
if Mr. Burns happens to be outside overlooking the stream that day. Let us 
also assume, then, that Mr. Burns suffers $100 of harm on average each 
year from the manufacturing process. Mr. Burns comes into court and sues 
to enjoin the factory’s operation. What should the court do? 
The court has two different choices to make. First, it must ask whether 
the factory is liable to Mr. Burns—in other words, who holds the property 
right, Mr. Burns to use the water for his aesthetic enjoyment or the factory 
to produce vaccines for children? Note that I am aware that I have stacked 
the deck in favor of the vaccine to challenge the common assumption that it 
is obvious that one might assign the property right to Mr. Burns in this 
case. Second, if the factory is liable, the question becomes whether Mr. 
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Burns should be able to enjoin the operation of the factory or whether 
Burns should be able to simply get damages for the harm he suffers. 
Now, one way to get at this answer would be to simply look at other 
similar cases from the past and apply the precedent to the case and 
determine whether liability should lie. Assume it does and assume that this 
gives Burns the right to sue for an injunction and shut down the plant. “So 
be it,” the classic common law lawyer might say, if that is what precedent 
mandates. But the mere statement of fact that the common law holds this 
result is not entirely normatively satisfying without some justification for 
that result. 
One justification of the common law rule would be to simply defer to 
the wisdom of the common law process as having some meta-justification, 
and thus, justifying the rule itself by reference to the normative justification 
of the common law superstructure that produces the rule. This is essentially 
the line of justification pursued by the historical school of jurisprudence 
associated with thinkers such as Henry Maine1, Savigny2, and Carlton 
Kemp Allen.3 Most notably for current purposes, this justification of 
particular common law rules by reference to the normative common law 
process is fundamentally the mode of justification offered by Hayek in 
Law, Legislation and Liberty.4 Hayek’s argument essentially tracks that of 
the historical school but with a normative justification: he argues that the 
common law is a benevolent spontaneous order, and as such, the normative 
justification resides in the tacit knowledge and unarticulated wisdom 
embedded in the legal doctrines produced by the evolution of the common 
law.5 The justification for individual rules, therefore, lies not in each rule’s 
individual merits as justified by reference to some normative external 
benchmark (such as “efficiency” or “egalitarianism”), but rather to 
propensity of the common law system itself to produce rules that benefit 
those living within the relevant society to further coordination among them. 
Moreover, Hayek views the relevant level of selection for common law 
rules as being at the level of group selection—the overall system of rules—
not individual selection of particular rules.6 Each of the individual rules of 
the common law are interlaced and enmeshed with numerous other rules 
and sets of private expectations and private orderings that have grown up 
around those rules. At root, Hayek suggests that rules demonstrate their 
normative merit through their survival properties: rules co-evolve within 
some overall order of rules that are subject to a quasi-Darwinian process of 
 
 1 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 1 (1920). 
 2 FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, VON SAVIGNY’S TREATISE ON POSSESSION (Sir Erskine Perry 
trans., Lawbook Exchange 6th ed. 2003) (1848).  
 3 CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING (Oxford Univ. Press 6th ed. 1958) (1927). 
 4 See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, VOLUME 1: RULES 
AND ORDER (Univ. of Chicago Press 1983) (1973). 
 5 Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 559, 581–83 (2008). 
 6 Id. at 583–84. 
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selection.7 Common law rules that have evolved from this process of 
selection can be assumed to have valuable survival properties demonstrated 
by the relative prospering of the groups that have adopted them and have 
thus stood the test of time. Therefore, one could pursue a normative 
justification for common law rules by following this line of argument; 
however, that is not the one I will pursue here. 
A legal realist might say, “Woah, see, here is the problem. The 
common law kills children. We need to update the common law to keep up 
with the times. The Court should take into account social values, yada, 
yada, yada, and if it decides it is best for Burns to suck it up, then so be it. 
Perhaps the justification is economic or Rawlsian or whatever, but 
children’s vaccines are more important than a selfish old man having to 
smell an unpleasant aroma once a year.” This attitude appears to be the 
prevailing ethos among many judges beginning with the New Deal and 
continuing today.8 However, this article is not addressed to this question 
either. 
The law and economics approach to the problem, à la Coase, is now 
well understood. Coase says that in a world with low transaction costs, it 
really does not matter how the rights are initially allocated as to whether 
the vaccine factory will remain in operation or not.9 Assume you give the 
property right to the factory to pollute. In that case, social wealth is 
maximized and aggregate efficiency is maximized because using the stream 
to manufacture the vaccine is worth much more than Burns’ inconvenience. 
Assume you give the right to Burns to prohibit pollution—does that mean 
the plant will cease operation and kids will die? No. Why not? Because if 
the operation of the plant generates a value of $1 billion, and Burns suffers 
only $100 of harm, then in a world without transaction costs (i.e., where 
parties can easily bargain and contract), the factory will be willing to “buy” 
the right to pollute from Burns for some price between $101 and $1 billion, 
and then pass along the cost to those who buy the product. The end result 
will match social efficiency—the stream will be used for the production of 
the vaccine—regardless of whether the initial property right is given to the 
factory or Burns. Under either initial allocation of the right, the end result is 
the same—the vaccine is made—regardless of whether the judge applies 
precedent or tries to advance “social justice.” 
B. Libertarianism 
What about the libertarian approach? I will draw on Murray Rothbard 
as an exemplar of the standard libertarian perspective, which is a natural 
rights approach to property rights.10 Rothbard is particularly useful in that 
 
 7 Id. at 585–86. 
 8 See, e.g., James E. Krier, Book Review, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1664, 1668–69, 1694 (1974) 
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972)). 
 9 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 10  Murray N. Rothbard, Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution, 2 CATO J. 55, 57 (1982). 
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his argument was made as a direct counterargument to the prevailing 
Chicago School of Law and Economics’ arguments of the time, including 
Coase.11 Rothbard makes several arguments in response to the Chicago 
School argument. Part of Rothbard’s critique is not expressly libertarian, 
such as the observation that wealth effects might matter. Part of Rothbard’s 
critique is that Mr. Burns might have subjective value that should be 
protected—perhaps he really cares more about not having to close his 
window one day per year than all of the lives that are saved through 
manufacturing children’s vaccines. Rothbard notes that if these are serious 
concerns—and they undoubtedly are—then they undermine the strength of 
the claim by standard law and economics scholars to know how to best 
allocate property rights to one party or the other. 
But so far Rothbard’s argument merely deconstructs that of standard 
law and economics. Rothbard, and the libertarian, must offer a competing 
rule for allocating property rights and liability in this case.  Rothbard offers 
the principle of physical invasion as his competing normative theory: 
The normative principle I am suggesting for the law is simply this: No action 
should be considered illicit or illegal unless it invades, or aggresses against, the 
person or just property of another. Only invasive actions should be declared 
illegal, and combated with the full powers of the law. The invasion must be 
concrete and physical. There are degrees of seriousness of such invasion, and 
hence, different proper degrees of restitution or punishment. “Burglary,” simple 
invasion of property for purposes of theft, is less serious than “robbery,” where 
armed force is likely to be used against the victim. [Here], however, we are not 
concerned with the questions of degrees of invasion or punishment, but simply 
with invasion per se. 
If no man may invade another person’s “just” property, what is our criterion of 
justice to be? There is no space here to elaborate on a theory of justice in 
property titles. Suffice it to say that the basic axiom of libertarian political theory 
holds that every man is a self-owner, having absolute jurisdiction over his own 
body. In effect, this means that no one else may justly invade, or aggress against, 
another’s person. It follows then that each person justly owns whatever 
previously unowned resources he appropriates or “mixes his labor with.” From 
these twin axioms—self-ownership and “homesteading”—stem the justification 
for the entire system of property rights titles in a free-market society. This system 
establishes the right of every man to his own person, the right of donation, of 
bequest (and, concomitantly, the right to receive the bequest or inheritance), and 
the right of contractual exchange of property titles.12 
From these basic premises of “just” property ownership derived from 
the principle of self-ownership, Rothbard goes on to derive a number of 
corollary conclusions. For example, he denounces the law of defamation 
and the common law right to privacy as restricting the principle of freedom 
of speech with no countervailing physical invasion.13 Moreover, Rothbard 
 
 11 Id. at 57–58. 
 12 Id. at 60–61. 
 13 Id. at 62. 
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(like most libertarian theorists) also concludes that libertarianism requires 
that the principle of strict liability be followed rather than negligence.14 
But having staked out an absolutist position, Rothbard soon retreats a 
bit. For example, he asks, why is it that the invasion of one’s property by 
radio waves does not constitute an actionable nuisance? The reason, he 
argues, is that these boundary crossings of invasion by radio waves  
do not interfere with anyone’s exclusive possession, use or enjoyment of their 
property. They are invisible, cannot be detected by man’s senses, and do no 
harm. They are therefore not really invasions of property, for we must refine our 
concept of invasion to mean not just boundary crossing, but boundary crossings 
that in some way interfere with the owner’s use or enjoyment of his property. 
What counts is whether the senses of the property owner are interfered with.15  
He thus concludes,  
[s]o we see that the proper distinction between trespass and nuisance, between 
strict liability per se and strict liability only on proof of harm, is not really based 
on “exclusive possession” as opposed to “use and enjoyment.” The proper 
distinction is between visible and tangible or “sensible” invasion, which 
interferes with possession and use of the property, and invisible, “insensible” 
boundary crossings that do not and therefore should be outlawed only on proof of 
harm.16 
Moreover, Rothbard goes on to acknowledge that when it comes to 
actions for nuisance for noise, property owners do not have a right to be 
protected from all noise but instead may be protected only from excessive 
noise.17 Those who have a special desire for quiet, Rothbard observes, must 
build their own soundproof room.18 He also would permit high-flying 
airplanes to violate the airspace above one’s home so long as they do not 
fly too low or too loudly to unreasonably disturb the landowner.19 
By this time, Rothbard has drifted quite far from his initial premise 
that any physical invasion of land is an abatable nuisance and anything else 
is not actionable. In particular, at this point it is not clear what work the 
concept of “physical invasion” is doing at all in his model—he has 
provided no explanation for why physical invasion is different from any 
other sort of interference with quiet use and enjoyment. Thus, despite his 
best efforts to avoid Coase, Rothbard has in fact implicitly come to concede 
the core premise that underlies the Coase Theorem—that what matters are 
incompatible and competing uses of scarce resources, and as a result, costs 
are reciprocal. It is only because both parties want to use the same scarce 
resource that incompatible uses arise. And those costs, broadly defined, 
arise only within a social context. Robinson Crusoe has no need for a law 
 
 14 Id. at 64–68. 
 15 Id. at 81 (emphasis added). 
 16 Id. at 82. 
 17 Id. at 83. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 84–87. 
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of tort, contract, or property. The need for law arises only when 
incompatible uses arise. Where resources are not scarce as an economic 
matter, there is no need for property rights or other laws. So if, for 
example, Mr. Burns did not live downstream or the vaccine factory did not 
operate upstream, then there would be no nuisance. Nor would nuisance 
arise if, for example, Mr. Burns only had a normal, and not a highly 
sensitive, sense of smell. Should it matter to whether the factory should be 
liable that Mr. Burns’ sense of smell is unusually sensitive? For if the vast 
majority of people lived in his house, there seemingly would be no 
nuisance under Rothbard’s own terms. It is only because of the 
combination of Mr. Burns and the factory that the need for a liability rule 
arises. And yet Rothbard’s simple rule of physical invasion seems to say 
little about whether the proper rule would be to essentially tell Mr. Burns to 
close his window one hour a year or the vaccine factory to board up shop. 
Despite his best efforts to articulate simple bright-line rules, 
Rothbard’s clear rules inevitably collapse under the weight of a multitude 
of ad hoc exceptions. But the myriad of exceptions illustrates the central 
problem—it is precisely the problem of incompatible uses that gives rise to 
the need to define property rights in the first place. And in the end, it seems 
he has to resort to redefining the principle of physical invasion to exclude 
radio waves. But it is not clear why physical invasion would not include 
invasion by radio waves but would include invasion by a tasteless, 
odorless, colorless liquid dumped into a stream. If the problem is 
incompatible uses among people then there is no obvious reason (as 
Rothbard implicitly admits) that it must be intrinsically tied to particular 
parcels of land or that the concept of physical invasion takes on some 
particular normative primacy. 
Of course, Coase and his followers offer one solution to this 
dilemma—where transaction costs are low, it does not matter in which 
party the property right is vested. Once allocated, they can then bargain to 
an efficient allocation of rights. Moreover, forcing the parties into a market 
transaction also has the benefit of protecting subjective value. If Mr. Burns 
really does favor the ability to be free of all smells at all times, then in 
theory he would be willing to out-bid the desires of the vaccine 
manufacturers and its customers to bring that result about. 
II.  LIBERTARIANISM VS. LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A WORLD WITH 
POSITIVE TRANSACTION COSTS 
The real issue then becomes, “Well what about those situations where 
transaction costs are not negligible, and as a result, the initial allocation of 
rights does or might matter because the parties will have difficulty 
contracting around the rule established by the court?” Then you must have 
some way of deciding how to allocate rights and how those rights are 
enforced by the parties. 
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Consider, for example, a situation where transaction costs are high. In 
the case of Ploof v. Putnam, the plaintiff went sailing on a lake with his 
wife and two children and was caught in a sudden and unexpected storm.20 
Plaintiff came up to defendant’s dock to escape the storm and tied up his 
boat to the dock. An employee of defendant unmoored the boat, and it 
drifted back out to the lake where it was destroyed by the storm. Plaintiff 
and his family were cast into the lake and injured. Plaintiff sued for 
damages for the injuries sustained and the destruction of the boat. Who 
wins? Plaintiff wins—defendant was required to allow the plaintiff to tie up 
his boat. The cost to the defendant of preventing the wreck was small while 
the boat was quite valuable. So the ruling is that defendant was required to 
allow plaintiff to tie up his boat, and plaintiff would be liable for any 
damage caused by the boat to the dock. 
Now if you are a Rothbardian libertarian then presumably you would 
say, “Hey, the dock is defendant’s property and he can do whatever he 
wants and plaintiff has no right to tie up his boat.” And if you have been 
paying attention you might say, “Hey it does not matter whether plaintiff 
has the right to tie up to the dock, because even if he doesn’t he can enter 
into a contract with the dock owner to ‘rent’ the dock for the duration of the 
storm.” But what is the problem with that view? Here transaction costs may 
be high, not low. The boat is in an emergency situation and defendant has 
plaintiff over a barrel. Defendant may use that leverage to drive a hard 
bargain with plaintiff. Now note that there is nothing wrong with that—the 
initial cost of the boat is a sunk cost (so to speak) and now the bargaining 
range is between the rental price of the dock and the total value of the boat, 
and as a result, there seems to be nothing more than a wealth or 
distributional effect here, not an efficiency effect. So if the dock owner 
drives a hard bargain and makes money, there is nothing necessarily wrong 
with that.  
So why does Ploof say that the boat owner essentially can “take” the 
dock for the duration of the storm and pay compensation for it? Because 
the bargaining process itself may be expensive. The time and energy that 
the parties spend bargaining over the division of spoils may be expensive 
and result in delay that could prove harmful to the ship or its crew. In the 
end, hard-bargaining by both parties might lead to a bargaining breakdown 
in which the ship itself does not get tied up in time and as a result is pushed 
out to sea and destroyed. For example, the parties just might not reach an 
agreement. Or the dock owner might decide to invest in a reputation as a 
hard bargainer and be willing to lose a bargain in this situation in order to 
capture a larger surplus in the future. 
The key concern that implicitly underlies the ruling is that the 
transactional context is a bilateral monopoly situation that converts this 
from a positive-sum market transaction to a zero-sum or even negative-sum 
 
 20 Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471 (1908). 
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rent-seeking transaction. The two parties are using real resources—their 
time and energy—bargaining over the division of the spoils within a 
bilateral monopoly context—they are not bargaining for an efficiency-
enhancing transaction. 
So what law and economics scholars suggest is that in situations such 
as this one, where transaction costs are high, the law should try to replicate 
the bargain that the parties likely would have struck had they been able to 
sit down and bargain out the terms, but are unable to do so because of the 
high transaction costs. And we expect that absent transaction costs, the 
bargain would have been that plaintiff could tie up at the dock but would be 
required to compensate the dock owner for any damage that the boat ended 
up doing to the dock. To be sure, we do not and cannot know for sure what 
the parties would have done, but there is strong intuition that this would be 
the result. 
Does this mean on a perfectly sunny day you can just pull up to some 
guy’s dock and tie up and then force him to sue you for rent for using his 
dock? No. In that situation you have to bargain between yourselves and 
reach a voluntary deal. Why—what is the difference? In this situation you 
are not in distress and you could conceivably tie your boat up somewhere 
else, so there is no need to use this particular dock. 
So note the insight of law and economics here—it ends up operating 
as both a positive and a normative theory. First, as a positive theory, it 
purports to correctly explain what the law actually is—the law of necessity 
operates as an exception to the general rule of property and tort that your 
property is yours to keep. It also purports to explain, as a positive matter, 
the limits on the rule—you can do this only if you are in duress and need to 
do it as a matter of necessity. If the parties can bargain with some degree of 
ease, then they must bargain. Moreover, law and economics offers a 
normative justification for the rule. The law is trying to cut through the 
waste of resources that could arise from either a complete bargaining 
breakdown (from the boat being wrecked) or the rent-seeking costs of 
bargaining over a purely distributional issue. So it is asserted that we 
maximize social wealth and interpersonal coordination by replicating the 
bargain the parties would have struck (applying the logic of the Coase 
Theorem) and simply use the force of the law to involuntary “force” the 
parties to act as if they had voluntarily entered into that transaction. 
To be sure, there are potential costs from this “hypothetical bargain” 
approach, and thus, one should be cautious about invoking it. One potential 
cost is that there might be efficiency concerns as well as distributional 
concerns. For example, it might be the case that docking slips are scarce, in 
that there are more boats needing to be docked than docking slips available, 
in which case Ploof essentially creates a “first come, first served” rule for 
allocating the docking slip. As a result, it is possible that a more valuable 
boat might come along later and would be willing to pay a higher price for 
the docking slip than the first boat that arrives. But it turns out that even if 
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this were to occur—a big if, of course, in the face of a brewing storm—it is 
not clear that this is an effective rejoinder to the doctrine of necessity rule. 
For just as the first boat owner and dock owner could bargain (but might 
not because of the transaction costs and bilateral monopoly situation), the 
second boat owner equally could bargain to “buy” the right to dock from 
the dock owner and first boat owner. True, the bilateral monopoly problem 
could arise again, but that is not fundamentally different from the original 
problem that was presented. 
A second objection might be that the dock owner could have 
subjective value about his dock and leasing it to this individual. While that 
is possible, and subjective value might be present in more situations than is 
conventionally thought,21 in this case, the likelihood that the dock owner 
has serious subjective value is low, and even if he does, it seems unlikely 
that the subjective value is large. 
Third, there might be a moral hazard problem. But one suspects that it 
is probably small as well. It is possible that at the margin, boat owners as a 
class will be slightly less careful about checking the weather or braving 
ominous weather in a world where the doctrine of necessity exists. 
However, it is difficult to believe that this incentive effect for moral hazard 
will be large if the boat owner is required to compensate the dock owner 
for the fair usage of the dock and any damage caused. Moreover, the 
alternative rule might, at the margin, encourage overprecaution by boat 
owners—if they know that in the face of a storm they run the risk of paying 
a monopoly price for the right to dock their boat in a storm, then boat 
owners may avoid taking out their boats when the weather is hardly 
threatening at all. 
All of these objections crystallize a larger potential objection to the 
common law rule: the law and economics analysis of this situation rests on 
a series of armchair empirical assessments. In particular, law and 
economics is assuming on one hand that the potential cost of rent-seeking, 
which arises from bargaining under the potentially high-transaction cost 
environment of a bilateral monopoly situation, is high and that under these 
narrow situations the benefits of channeling interactions through voluntary 
market exchanges is relatively low. Forcing the parties to bargain expressly 
will protect subjective value and might address the problem of efficient 
allocation of resources; however, the potential for waste of resources and 
potentially even a complete bargaining breakdown are thought to warrant 
invocation of the doctrine of necessity in circumscribed circumstances. 
Now consider the flip side of Ploof—a situation where the parties 
enter into a voluntary transaction but it nonetheless is not enforceable. The 
case is Alaska Packers v. Domenico.22 Here are the facts. The year is 1900. 
 
 21 See Todd J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law, 46 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961 (1996) (discussing the ubiquity of subjective value). 
 22 Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). 
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The company charters a salmon fishing vessel and has just made a huge 
capital investment in building a big salmon cannery factory up in Alaska. 
The way the industry works is that the salmon fishing season is only a 
couple of months long, so all of the salmon must be caught during that 
time. Then the fish are delivered to the cannery for smoking and packaging, 
which need to be done within a short time after the salmon are caught. The 
salmon company, of course, is counting on the salmon harvest to provide 
them with the revenues to pay off the cannery. If the salmon do not come 
in, then the investment in the factory will be squandered. 
The company hires a crew of fishermen in San Francisco before the 
season actually starts. They get on the boat and cruise up to Alaska to start 
fishing. Once the fishermen get there they make a demand—we are not 
fishing any more unless you give us a raise (the actual facts are actually 
more interesting but asking for a raise basically captures the essence of the 
demand). In response to this demand, the captain of the boat originally 
refuses, but after the fishermen stay on strike the captain finally relents. 
The fishermen then go back to work and finish out the season. The 
fishermen return to San Francisco at the end of the season and the owner of 
the company pays them only what they were originally contracted to be 
paid, not the modified deal for double salary. The fishermen sue, saying 
that they had a valid contract for the higher wage rate. 
What is the holding? Fishermen lose. Why? Well, the common law 
doctrine is the “pre-existing duty rule” which says that once you contract to 
do something, you cannot then refuse to do what you contracted to do 
unless the other side gives you more money (what we call “consideration”). 
Now this doctrinal resolution in and of itself begs the real question, which 
is “why” does it matter whether the party gives additional consideration? 
And if you take a rights-based approach of “enforce contracts” it is not 
obvious which of the two contracts to enforce—the first one or the second 
modified one? Both were freely consented to. 
One might try to argue that the second contract was invalid because 
there was a lack of free consent by the employer—essentially that the 
modification was extracted under duress. But, of course, this argument 
amounts merely to an effort to escape the conundrum by way of ipse 
dixit—by simply defining the second contract to be invalid or caused by 
duress. In fact, the second contract was not formed under what common 
law would consider as duress. A mere threat to breach a contract does not 
constitute duress to the non-breaching party. Otherwise, every time an 
employer provided a raise to an employee who was considering leaving to 
take another job at higher pay, it would constitute duress. Moreover, there 
simply is no reason why parties cannot voluntarily agree to enter into a 
contract but then also voluntarily agree to modify the contract later if the 
relevant information about the world changes.  
Law and economics, however, provides a mechanism for 
understanding why the court’s decision in Alaska Packers makes sense 
Do Not Delete 4/13/2013 11:28 PM 
320 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 16:2 
(leaving aside the hoary fiction of the pre-existing duty rule). For Alaska 
Packers is essentially Ploof in reverse, and the proper answer is also Ploof 
in reverse. What is the difference between the stormy day and the sunny 
day in the Ploof scenario? On the sunny day, we make you bargain because 
if you do not like the first guy’s deal, you can go to the next dock and ask 
to tie up there. Both dock-owners and boat-owners are interacting in what 
is basically a competitive market with substitutes available for both sides. 
On the stormy day you cannot, so we invoke necessity to “force” a bargain. 
Here it is the opposite. Why do we treat the bargain struck in San Francisco 
as the “real” bargain as opposed to the bargain on the boat in Alaska? 
Because in San Francisco, there is a competitive labor market. In Alaska 
there is not. And why can the fishermen succeed in getting a higher price 
for their work in Alaska? Because of the exigencies of time and the ability 
of the fishermen essentially to hold hostage the company’s investment in 
the salmon cannery. The company needs them to work in order to get 
enough fish to recover its capital investment in the construction and 
operation of the salmon cannery. So like Ploof, what is driving the 
fishermen’s actions in Alaska Packers is rent-seeking behavior where the 
fishermen are expending real resources (the opportunity cost of remaining 
idle and the canning factory remaining idle) that are designed to 
expropriate the company’s investment in the cannery to raise their wages. 
By not working, they can essentially destroy the value of the cannery by 
there being no fish. In this way it is like the dock owner in Ploof who 
knows he can drive a hard bargain because the alternative is the destruction 
of the boat. And like in Ploof, we do not want to encourage people to invest 
real resources in what is primarily rent-seeking activity designed just to 
extract a larger distributional share rather than an efficiency gain by the 
fishermen essentially trying to capture some of the value of the cannery 
itself. So again, the transaction costs are high—but here the transaction 
costs are high because of the threat of strategic behavior by the fishermen. 
Once more it appears that law and economics gives us both the positive and 
normative explanations—wherever possible, we want parties to bargain in 
situations with competitive markets, such as on the dock in San Francisco 
rather than on the boat in Alaska. So here, rather than essentially creating a 
forced transaction, we are nullifying a freely-bargained transaction. 
A. The Limiting Principle 
But the libertarian might respond, “This analysis proves too much: if 
we are concerned about transaction costs, why not get rid of market 
exchanges completely? Rather than having parties negotiate and use up 
transaction costs, why not have courts come in and order how assets should 
be allocated?” Consider an example. I own a photograph of “The 
Immaculate Reception” autographed by Franco Harris himself. Assume its 
market value would be $100 on eBay but there are currently no others 
listed for sale. And assume you come to me and offer me $125 for it and I 
turn you down. You sue and you say to the court, “Look Your Honor, it is 
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clear what is going on here. Zywicki is like the dock owner in Ploof. There 
are very few of these things, so if I cannot buy it from Zywicki, then I 
cannot buy it from anyone else. And look it is only worth $100, but he is 
refusing to take $125 for it. Obviously he is taking advantage of my 
situation to try to extort a higher price out of me than it is worth. So I want 
you to order him to give it to me and I will give him $101 and social 
welfare will be maximized.” 
Does this work? No. Why not? Because it is not true that this is like 
Ploof. Why not? Because the real reason I am not selling is because the 
picture truly is worth more to me than $100 or $125. Why? Because I 
received my autographed picture as a gift, so it has idiosyncratic or 
subjective value to me, making it worth more to me than the market price. 
On the other hand, I might be acting strategically—perhaps I say it has 
subjective value but it does not and I really am just trying to get you to pay 
more, so I am “holding out” on you and trying to act like the dock owner in 
Ploof. Is this plausible? No, because there are in fact substitutes or close 
substitutes for this particular picture, it is just a matter of finding them. So I 
do not actually have hold out power over you. 
So what does this mean? In general, we have a default preference for 
individuals to make exchanges via a voluntary market setting rather than 
having courts engage in “forced” transactions. Why? In part because we are 
concerned about the presence of idiosyncratic or subjective value. For 
courts to coerce transactions where transaction costs are low and bilateral 
monopoly problems nonexistent risks sacrificing the benefits of market 
exchanges. 
Forced transactions along the lines of Ploof therefore, should be a 
narrow exception to the general rule that economic activity should be 
organized through voluntary market exchanges and not by asking courts to 
circumvent the market process and thereby to “force” transactions when 
market processes are fully capable of providing a consensual and 
economically efficient means for allocating resources. Admittedly, Ploof 
can create a temptation to turn judges into central planners and to be unduly 
deferential to market exchanges. The same principle explains why the “on 
the dock” transaction should prevail over the “at sea” transaction in Alaska 
Packers. 
And one can easily point to situations at law where judges—often 
instigated by law and economics scholars themselves—have done exactly 
that. Consider the imposition of strict products liability in tort and the 
displacement of contractual warranty law for products liability with tort 
law. The rise of strict products liability in tort was one of the early 
innovations conjured up by law and economics scholars, most notably then-
professor and now-judge Guido Calabresi.23 And, to be sure, strict 
 
 23 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (Yale Univ. Press 1970). 
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adherence to libertarian freedom of contract principles likely would have 
averted this intellectual dead-end by honoring the right of the parties to 
enter into consensual risk allocation arrangements regarding these products. 
In retrospect, however, it is evident that strict products liability in tort 
was predicated on faulty economics. For quite plainly the intellectual error 
at the root of strict products liability is the central planner’s fallacy that the 
judge (or any other central planner) can accurately anticipate and weigh all 
of the possible effects of the rule. Consider an easy example. It has been 
estimated that the cost of liability and liability insurance now comprises 
thirty percent of the cost of a stepladder.24 All the better, a naïve lawyer-
economist might think: stepladders can be dangerous and if people are 
injured by stepladders economic efficiency requires that they must 
“internalize” the costs of those injuries. So if a person is injured by a 
foreseeable use of a stepladder, say by falling off it, then stepladder 
manufacturers should be liable. Moreover, perhaps it makes sense for 
stepladder manufacturers to bear the cost of compensating stepladder 
consumers, and “spread” the cost of those injuries across many stepladders 
simply by raising the price. 
But this analysis is faulty in two ways. First, the effect of making the 
ladder company liable essentially compels every consumer to purchase a 
personal injury liability policy with every stepladder that they purchase—
and given the administrative cost of running the tort system, it would be an 
exceedingly expensive insurance policy. But the overwhelming number of 
consumers already have health insurance policies, and thus, forcing them to 
buy an additional insurance policy is simply a waste of money. They 
already have insurance, and thus, it is perfectly rational that they might 
want to forego a mandatory purchase of an insurance policy from the 
ladder company. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the ladder 
company is in a better position to provide health insurance to a consumer at 
a lower cost than an actual insurance company. Thus, the effect is to coerce 
consumers to buy both a ladder and an insurance policy when they often 
will only want the ladder itself.   
But there is a second and larger problem that arises. Once the price of 
a ladder is increased by thirty percent, many consumers will not purchase a 
ladder who otherwise would. But the burned out light bulb in the ceiling 
still needs changing regardless of whether the consumer has a stepladder or 
not. So we know what happens next—rather than standing on a stepladder, 
the consumer stands on a chair which then topples over and causes injury. 
Yet everyone knows you are not supposed to use a chair for changing a 
light bulb, thus the consumer is unlikely to be able to recover against the 
chair-maker for injuries caused from that use of the chair. The net result, 
therefore, is not to cause the ladder-maker to internalize the costs of the 
ladder, it simply is to shift consumer behavior away from relatively more 
 
 24 PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3 (1990). 
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safe ladders to relatively less safe chairs increasing the overall number of 
injuries suffered. 
Does this unfortunate doctrinal development demonstrate that law and 
economics is thus an inferior mode of analysis compared to libertarian 
contractarianism? Perhaps, and one reasonably could make that case. On 
the other hand, I think it is more reasonable to observe that just because 
there is a potential for bad economic analysis, it does not necessarily mean 
that it would be worthwhile to throw out the baby with the bathwater and 
abandon well-grounded economic analysis. 
Instead, what the example of the misuse of economics to support the 
rise of strict liability and the abandonment of contract law really cautions 
against is overindulgence in the central planner’s fallacy. The real lesson 
taught by this unfortunate intellectual error is that judges should be humble 
when considering constructing new legal rules that would supplant 
longstanding contractarian and voluntary solutions.25 Stepladders are 
bought and sold in a competitive market after all, and thus, consumers can 
choose among a variety of ladder companies potentially offering a variety 
of different “insurance” policy riders for their ladders. Consumers could 
thus choose whether to buy a ladder with or without the insurance rider. 
One suspects that most would prefer a cheaper ladder and to supply their 
own health insurance, rather than a more expensive ladder sold with 
implicit insurance. And most certainly, many marginal consumers who are 
priced out of the ladder market and forced to stand on a chair (thereby 
dramatically increasing their chance of injury) will almost certainly have 
preferred the less-dangerous and less-expensive option to be able to buy a 
ladder. 
III.  LIBERTARIANISM AND LAW AND ECONOMICS COMPARED 
Although this article has focused on examples of situations in which 
libertarianism and law and economics are in conflict, it should not be 
forgotten that as a general rule they strongly agree. The libertarian 
emphasis on the protection of property rights and nuisance is sound 
economics as well as clear articulation of property rights, and general 
enforcement of contractual exchanges are generally good for economic 
efficiency and interpersonal coordination as well. 
Nevertheless, there are times where the pragmatic, contextual, 
economically-animated logic of the common law reaches conclusions 
different from that of libertarianism. From my personal perspective, I have 
come to conclude that the common law and law and economics approaches 
provide rules superior to that of libertarian philosophy. Admittedly, I am 
smuggling in normative intuitions to support this conclusion: that the 
implicit normative purpose of the common law is to further interpersonal 
coordination and maximize the surplus of social living more than it is the 
 
 25 Zywicki & Sanders, supra note 5. 
Do Not Delete 4/13/2013 11:28 PM 
324 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 16:2 
protection of individual rights. The particularities of that debate go beyond 
the scope of this article. 
But in the end there are two basic ideas that have led me away from 
the Rothbardian natural rights vision of law toward a more Hayekian and 
law and economics view of the common law. First, I am unable to escape 
the logical conclusion that at root, costs are reciprocal—that conflicts arise 
over incompatible uses of scarce resources because the parties are mutually 
interfering with each other’s use of those resources. And that second, the 
purpose of law is to maximize the gains of social living by maximizing the 
benefits of interpersonal coordination and minimizing waste. In the end, I 
find that cases like Ploof and Alaska Packers strike me as correctly decided 
and the economic principles that underlay them are sound as well—and 
between those outcomes and the outcomes provided by libertarian 
philosophy I find the results of law and economics and the common law 
superior to libertarianism. 
 
